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Public Apologia, Moral Transgression 
and Degradation Ceremonies
Abstract: This paper discusses some socio‑psychological aspects of reconciliation with the recent 
communist past in Eastern Europe using the example of a public apologia of a Romanian public 
intellectual on his alleged collaboration with the Securitate, the former communist secret police. 
The paper argues that public apologia for wrongdoing displays a double dynamic of degradation: 
personal and institutional. It is argued that public apologia serves a two‑fold function: on the one 
hand, it is an attempt to manage a personal “spoiled” identity and provides the grounds for 
atonement. On the other hand, it is an attempt to (re)write biography by elucidating the influence 
of the wider social context relevant to identity transformation. By drawing on sociological work on 
degradation ceremonies and discourse analysis in social psychology, the paper shows how public 
apologia can be understood as a social product and discursive accomplishment.
Key words: biography, degradation ceremonies, discursive psychology, communist past, public 
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Apologia
Public apologia coming from politicians, public figures, etc. is the quintessentially speech 
act in political life (cf. Abadi, 1990). As I have shown elsewhere (Tileagă, in press), contem‑
porary researchers of apologia are interested more in its felicitous aspects (Simons, 2000; 
Kampf, 2009) or its role as image restoration strategies (Benoit, 1995) than in its situated 
discursive organization. For instance, speech‑act theorists are interested in the structural 
features of apologies and their felicity conditions. According to Lakoff (2001), in order to 
be felicitous, apologies “require at least the appearance of contrition” (p. 203, italics in 
original). For Simons, apologists face “dilemmas of pragmatic nature” (2000, p. 442). 
Simons analyzes the Clinton apology of 1998 and concludes that the “force” and impact 
of political apologia come from sounding like a genuine apology. The apologist needs to 
make the most of the “rhetorical situation” in order to manage successfully a “spoiled” 
personal and political identity. Other researchers treat apologia as a complex of image 
restoration strategies (Benoit, 1995). They are interested in the effectiveness of certain 
image restoration strategies (for instance, denial). For image restoration theorists such as 
Benoit, “it is time to focus more on offering suggestions concerning when to use certain 
1. Discourse and Rhetoric Group, Department of Social Sciences, Loughborough University, UK.
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image restoration strategies” (1995, p. 29). For both speech‑act and image restoration 
theorists one needs to understand first and foremost “what works, when, under what 
circumstances”. The most common assumption of apologia is that what lies behind it is a 
strategic motivation to save face. Apologia brings into the foreground the cultural norm of 
remedial work on social relationships through language (Owen, 1983). Apologies can 
manage threats to face (Goffman, 1971), restore or protect one’s reputation (Benoit, 1995) 
or reconstruct moral relations (Walker, 2006).
Public apologia can always be constructed by commentators as serving some ulterior, 
strategic motive of image restoration or reparation. One can always find problems with 
issues such as insufficient remorse, less penitent discourse, self‑serving rhetoric. But saving 
face, image restoration or reparation are not the sole motivations that explain how public 
apologia is structured to accomplish social actions: displaying regret, mitigating guilt, 
making amends, and so on. It can be argued that this perspective on apologia downplays 
the idea that apologia is also an exercise of managing moral self‑assessment that presupposes 
entering into a dialogical relationship of mutual orientation to “what it means to be moral”, 
“what it means to say sorry”, and so on. Public apologia, either as expression of a guilty 
conscience or an attempt to save face, is first and foremost a discursive performance. Apologia 
is a social activity, part and parcel of a performative discursive order. As Meier has cogently 
put it, apologia provides an “especially apt object of study for exploring the relationship 
between underlying cultural assumptions and linguistic behavior” (1998, p. 227).
Apologia displaces the (confessional) self into the “social”, opening a public space of 
judgment. The problem is less whether apologies are felicitous or not, whether they are 
composed of effective image restoration strategies, but what they do, what they accomplish 
in a space of public visibility. The simplest way of approaching public apologia is to consider 
it as some attempt at self‑defense. That is, incidentally, the cultural meaning of apologia 
we get from Plato’s Apology. As such, apologia is a species of argumentative discourse. 
As Potter (1996) suggested, every piece of argumentative discourse necessarily can be 
described in terms of “offensive” (critical) rhetorical aspects in so far as it explicitly or 
implicitly seeks to undermine rival versions of events, and “defensive” (justificatory) aspects 
in so far as speakers attempt to “inoculate” their accounts from attack by rivals. One can 
go even further and argue that apologia is more than a special case of offensive and defensive 
rhetoric. What also counts is the rhetorical trajectory of accounts. When you apologize you 
start something – you start a rhetorical chain of explicit and implicit meanings, presuppositions, 
implications. Rhetorical claims can support, qualify or undermine earlier claims. Attack 
or defense can be rhetorically tailored to respond to cultural demands related to atonement, 
regret, morality, and so on. 
Apologia is not a self‑sufficient speech act; it opens a dialogical relation between 
apologist and “public”. Research has shown that public apologies are not “accepted” in the 
same way as personal apologies are (those in face‑to‑face conversation, for instance, see 
Robinson, 2004). For instance, in her analysis of perpetrators of extreme violence, Payne 
has shown how “paradoxically, the act of confession [and apology] makes perpetrators seem 
less, not more, trustworthy: that they could commit atrocity casts doubt on the earnestness 
of their subsequent remorse. Perpetrators only rarely craft the kind of remorseful confessions 
that convince audiences of their sincerity” (2008, p. 56). Apologia places a psychological 
and moral “burden” on both producer and recipient/audience (Lakoff, 2001). One needs 
to be able to analyze how this psychological and moral “burden” is managed, especially 
by apologists but also by audiences. We usually tend to assume that there is a “public” out 
there that is easily identifiable, that demands an apologia, that passes a judgment, and who 
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is coherent in its stance of indignation directed at alleged wrongdoing. It is usually assumed 
that the “public” embodies a unitary and coherent moral vision of society that informs 
decisions of who is (or not) decent or respectable (Goode, 2004). Yet, the moral vision of 
society is not unitary, as it can include different moral visions, can be quite diverse, 
heterogeneous, and including a variety of morality stances, on a continuum from absolutist 
to relativist stances (Tileagă, 2012).
Moral transgression and degradation ceremonies
Public apologia is in most cases the consequence of moral transgression. Indignation, 
outrage, disgust, disbelief are just some reactions to moral transgression. Moral indignation is 
perhaps the strongest of reactions. Moral indignation is expressed through public denunciation 
(Garfinkel, 1956, p. 421). Public denunciation brings with it various forms of identity 
degradation and transformation (see for instance, the McCarthy era in the United States or 
Stasi informers in East Germany). Once denounced, an individual’s identity is transformed, 
degraded. He or she has to justify the self to others.
The same applies to what one might call self‑denunciations, self‑confessions of wrongdoing. 
In this context it is perhaps more beneficial to conceive of public apologia as an identity 
demotion or self‑degradation ceremony (cf. Garfinkel, 1956). The atonement rituals of 
politicians and public figures create a very specific form of moral justice based on the 
degradation of one’s self in front of others, a form of identity management whose consequences 
are sometimes very hard to predict. The chosen method of self‑degradation can have different 
effects on successful spoiled identity management and successful reintegration, reconstruction 
of moral relations. In the context of coming to terms with the past in Eastern Europe, I am 
concerned with how public apologia as self‑degradation ceremony constructs the subjectivity 
of the apologist and how it can offer a different perspective on social remembering not in 
terms of retrieval and storage, and generally, “representation” of the past, but rather as 
social practice that facilitates the creation of subjectivities, of different perspectives on the 
sources of self and context. As this paper will hopefully show, subjectivities are created 
and “spoiled” identities are managed by recounting different versions of the past through 
the mediation of other selves, material traces, narratives (cf. Brown, 2012).
What Garfinkel (1956) referred to as “degradation ceremonies” are exercises of identity 
management. Garfinkel insists mostly on the formal aspects of degradation ceremonies in 
settings such as courts of law, or the army. Formal settings are sanctioned by a set of strict 
rules – behaviour is judged against objective, organizationally relevant and ratified standards 
of behaviour. When describing degradation ceremonies, Garfinkel describes a process from 
which there is no escape, no loophole. It is a process that follows the formal sequence: 
disapproval > degradation > exclusion. The process of formal degradation insists upon 
fitting an identity of “total” deviance with a single, coherent set of motives, into a black 
and white scheme of things. As Erikson argues, degradation ceremonies “are almost 
irreversible” (1962, p. 311). You cannot go back to what you were. If you have been found 
to transgress the rules of an institutional community you will be demoted by that institution 
to a lesser species of identity or excluded. What happens when you extend the notion of 
degradation ceremonies to the public sphere? What happens when you have to deal with 
what one might call self‑degradation?
The essence of a self‑degradation ceremony is: I call upon you (the audience) to bear 
witness that I am not what I appear! To degrade someone is to declare that person “no 
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longer one of us” (this can take the form of exclusion or demotion). Self‑degradation 
involves self‑demotion. In the public sphere, degradation is not posited on some hierarchical 
structure (like in the case of military, courts of law), but rather is linked to the contingency 
of the public sphere, where different opinions can be held and ideological dilemmas exist 
(Billig, 1991). Demoting someone in the military can seem uncontroversial. Usually “one 
is found guilty” and brought to face the others (his/her peers). What happens when one 
finds himself/herself guilty? What happens when the apologist willingly diminishes his 
own community status?
The paper argues that public apologia as self‑demotion, self‑degradation ceremony opens 
and takes into account “multiple interpretations of responsibility” (Braithwaite & Mugford, 
1994, p. 146). I contend that public apologia (especially that related to alleged collaboration 
with the Securitate) can be considered a special case of self‑degradation. In the context of 
alleged collaboration with the secret police, the apologist declares himself to be a certain 
sort of degraded person (a “snitch”, an “informer”). The broader question is how is 
self‑degradation accomplished? Self‑degradation is akin to an auto‑ethnography where the 
“ethnographic exemplar” (Gergen & Gergen, 2002) is the “self”. Taking oneself as an 
“ethnographic exemplar” is a way to ensure that a deviant, morally transgressive, identity 
“does not become a master status trait that overwhelms other identities” (Braithwaite & 
Mugford, 1994, p. 142). As the analysis will show, auto‑ethnography cannot be accomplished 
without relying on a documentary version of reality (Smith, 1990; Prior, 2004). The self 
is bound by the formal archive of the Securitate and by Securitate’s work as professional 
degrader, as producer and user of “technologies of self” for control, oppression and 
manipulation, and surveillance of individuals. Such technologies of self have created diverse 
“moral careers”, to use Goffman’s term, for various individuals (both those directly 
participating to the system and those suffering the consequences of its implementation).
The Securitate as a “total” institution
The Securitate can be likened to a structure whose role is primordially to “degrade”, that 
is, to transform, constitute and reconstitute identities and biographies. As Garfinkel suggested, 
it is usually “organizational variables” that will “determine the effectiveness of a program 
of degradation tactics” (p. 420). The foremost degradation tactic of the Securitate was to 
ensure that no one was what he or she appeared to be! The essence of Securitate’s work 
was to transform an individual’s self‑identity and replacing it with a range of “new” identities 
(from the apparatus of surveillance to the on‑the‑ground operatives or informal collaborators). 
Its method of “degradation” relied on an organizational ethic and pragmatics that constituted 
identities through the mediation of the Securitate “file”. The Securitate’s degradation work 
was directed towards transforming an individual’s identity into an identity lower in the 
relevant group’s scheme of social types. Securitate’s degradation work created moral 
categories. One of them is that of the “informer”, the “snitch”1. “Informer” is a moral 
category that derives from a whole array of practices, ways of apportioning responsibilities, 
surveillance and reporting activities, etc. The Securitate, as a “total” (Goffman) or “complete” 
1. Depending on the socio‑communicative context in which it is used, in actual social usage or as an 
institutional label, the category “informer” can sometimes have a vague or a very definite meaning, 
and can be applied to people loosely or strictly.
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(Foucault)1 institution, was a world cut off from the rest, with its own rules, responsibilities, 
and serving the interests of social oppression and the ruling communist order. Its “totality” 
comes from subordinating individual subjectivities, needs, actions, and motivations to state 
bureaucratic and social control. The “total” institution of the Securitate functioned as a 
perverse social arrangement that personified a rational plan of social control that exercises 
power over all the spheres of an individual’s life – private and public life, sexuality, wishes, 
desires, motives, and so on.
As a “total” institution serving the interests of a totalitarian social and political order, 
the Securitate reproduced itself as a control system of creating subjectivities and identities 
for whoever was located in its documents (regardless whether you were an informer, or 
informed on). The Securitate created an “archontic infrastructure”2 (Middleton & Brown, 
2005), where categories of knowledge, memory and practice, but also individual biographical 
“durations” became collected, stored, in the name of an oppressive ruling, institutional/
state order (Smith, 1999). The Securitate’s operational archive (files, documents, guidelines, 
orders, etc.) was such an archontic infrastructure. The “archon” (the Securitate) charged 
with the safekeeping of the archive constructed an authoritative version of reality that not 
only controlled, but also transformed the self‑definition of whoever was indexed in the 
archive. Individuals were irretrievably attached and defined by this archontic structure.
Any contemporary attempt at (re)writing or re‑claiming biography from under the sway 
of the Securitate is required to take into account this structure (and its internal mechanism). 
Personal recollections, self‑disclosures, stand in a sine qua non relation to an intricate 
“network of mediated activities” (Middleton & Brown, 2005, p. 147) around state control 
and surveillance. The Securitate archive is not simply a support to remembering biographical 
details, but mediates a complex rhetoric of identity and memory. The individual can place 
the Securitate’s documentary reality within “biographical” time, and use it as a resource 
to fill biographical “gaps” and manage a “spoiled” identity. At the same time, the individual 
is placed by the Securitate’s documentary reality within a semiotic sequence of surveillance 
practices and organizationally accomplished sense of identity.
Historians and social scientists have demonstrated cogently how an analysis of Securitate’s 
documents can reveal the inner workings of the Securitate (see for instance, Albu, 2008). 
They could demonstrate how Securitate’s central authority was subordinated to the state 
and party’s authority. They could show the ways in which the Securitate served the goals 
of “total” control and “total” incarnation of the guiding values of the socialist project. They 
could expose its ultimate goal: to produce disciplined and docile selves that would serve 
the reproduction of the communist social, political and ideological order. Although important 
in its own right, historical and documentary analysis focuses less on identity transformation 
itself, on how people are transformed once they are located, mentioned, in the Securitate 
“file” or descriptions accompanying documents. Identity transformation is a process linked 
to personal identity, memory, biography and an organizational accomplishment of accounta‑
bility (see Tileagă, 2011). The public apologist is engaged in a process of understanding the 
social mechanism and social arrangements that have led to its identity transformation.
1. On the notion of “total institutions” see Goffman (1961). On “complete” institutions see Foucault’s 
Discipline and Punish. For “degradation” linked to institutions, and on the humiliating organization, 
see Smith (2002). 
2. By archontic infrastructure I mean the use of formal classifications, and standards, and other 
“technical” ways of capturing subjectivities (cf. Middleton and Brown, 2005).
72 CRISTIAN TILEAGĂ
 
Public apologia and self‑degradation
The example discussed here is that of a public apologia of a Romanian public intellectual 
on his alleged collaboration with the Securitate in an open letter sent to a national newspaper. 
The letter is divided by the writer into two parts: the “Essence” and the “Existence”. The 
letter is described by the newspaper as a “harrowing document”. It is placed under “Current 
affairs” (“Actualitate”) with the gist prefaced by the author’s name: “Am turnat la Securitate” 
(“I was an informer for the Securitate”). The letter (and apologia contained in it) is 
suggestive of an identity transformation (see Tileagă, 2009b for a discursive analysis of the 
“Essence”). From the outset the writer declares himself to be a certain sort of degraded 
person, a person of a lower identity in the relevant group’s scheme of social types – an 
“informer”, a “snitch”. As I have mentioned previously, in formal terms, degradation 
presupposes a process of demotion in terms of grade, rank, or status. It also entails 
undergoing certain stages or imposition of certain degrading postures. In Goffman’s terms, 
a person’s self is “mortified” by the dispossession of the person from previously held roles, 
dispossession of the person of cherished possessions, forcing the adoption of stances 
inconsistent with one’s notion of self, degrading postures or deference stances, exposure 
to humiliating circumstances, restrictions imposed on self‑determination and autonomy. The 
subsequent examples taken from the “Existence” show how similar concerns can be applied 
to issues of self‑mortification, self‑degradation in public apologia.
In extract 1 one can see the writer engaged in an effort of “de‑certifying” moral 
transgression by placing it within a self‑reflexive stance that turns the self into an “object” 
of public and self‑scrutiny. Notice the use of rhetorical questions that follow the opening 
sentence to frame the issue as one of genuine moral concern (on the use of rhetorical 
questions in discourse see Ilie, 1999). The questions are presented as genuine moral 
questions with a predictable psychological answer: “the stigma of duplicity”1.
[1] The 1980‑1982 phase of my collaboration with the Securitate was for me one of intense 
moral crisis… How did I live through that period? How is that period inscribed in my memory? 
With the stigma of duplicity. Nonetheless, as I have shown, I contend that I did not ultimately, 
in the last analysis, betrayed my friends and acquaintances.
The rhetorical questions act as premises to a morality stance. The “stigma of duplicity” 
indexes a self‑degradation move whereby, as Goffman argued, the writer can “split” himself 
into two parts, “the part that is guilty of an offence and the part that disassociates itself 
from the delict and affirms a belief in the offended rule” (1971, p. 113). The use of the 
psychological term “stigma” signals how duplicity was experienced: as degradation of self, 
as symbolic identity “mark” that one cannot “shed”, “get rid of”. “Duplicity” has the effect 
of lowering self‑identity on the group’s morality scheme. Yet duplicity does not tell the 
whole story. The writer creates a symbolic pecking order of degradation, and is careful to 
distance himself from the lowest and despicable position on the group’s morality scheme: 
“betraying your friends and acquaintances”.
Depicting the writer as trying to “save face” would be too simple an explanation. What 
one notices instead is an intricate justificatory scaffolding that includes moral self‑assessment 
1. The writer seems to assume that the implied addressee knows what it means to experience an 
“intense moral crisis”.
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and management of moral identity. In extract 2 the writer justifies his “silence” by pointing 
to an implicit paradox: the paradox of “freedom”. In order for a moral identity to be uphold, 
silence needs to be explained. The prolonged silence is construed as an opportunity to 
postpone the recognition of an undignified identity. Not confessing, not disclosing the details 
of a tarnished past, means breaking free of a subjectivity “regimented” by the bureaucratic 
and archontic infrastructure of the Securitate. Paradoxically, it is not confession that liberates 
the person, but silence. The writer can be seen as symbolically opposing the degradation 
work of the Securitate, one that restricts an individual’s autonomy and freedom of action. 
He points to a paradoxical situation where freedom is not actually “freedom” as everyone 
knew or experienced it.
[2] if I haven’t talked about these things not even after 1989, when my life wasn’t threatened 
by the “system”, it is because I wanted to be free for a while and to build myself a new life 
before the past would catch up with me. In this way I have gained a biography… a free biography 
for the first time, although, until today, sabotaged from the inside, and from today in the public 
space, by my silence. Anyway, all those who have had to hide anything serious from others will 
understand what I mean.
Implicitly, the writer points to the degrading power of the Securitate. Recounting and 
reclaiming his biography are conducted under the aegis and degrading authority of the 
Securitate. The writer finds himself in the position of having to “curtail” his own self and 
expresses a feeling of being “trapped” in the situation created by his own disclosure. He is 
reflexively aware that he lacks the freedom to defend himself, or the freedom he had before the 
disclosure. Rhetorically, the writer inoculates himself against being seen as having concealed 
the truth from some ulterior motive. He describes concealment as forced concealment rather 
than stemming from some hidden motivation. A “new life” and “free biography” are 
constrained both by inner resolutions as well external constraints.
In extract 3 one can see how the stance from extract 2 is further explicated through an 
account that testifies to losing one’s capacity to present a genuine self, image to others, 
due to “passage” through the institution of the Securitate.
[3] I hated the Securitate, the whole party‑state and all its followers, with a double hate: for 
what they were doing to the country, and for what they were doing to me, from the privations 
that we were all suffering to the pressure that made me lower myself to the undignified condition 
of a snitch. All that remains is that all those who will judge me harshly not believing what I 
have to say in my defense – the defense of a person who recognizes his guilt – to take nonetheless 
into account all my life.
The reference to “hate” places the confession in the realm of a psychological and 
emotional relation to personal history. Hate is a psychological term for denoting an extreme 
emotional position, in this case describing a “total” ethical positioning. As Edwards (1999) 
noted emotion terms can be used to bolster a subjective view/position and support the 
factuality and plausibility of narrative accounts. The writer provides a basis for his relationship 
with the Securitate by placing it inside a strong subjective emotional stance. Hate is not an 
emotional stance from without; it needs to be justified through reference to self and the 
collective (“the country”), which are the two sides of the same coin. In another self‑reflexive 
move the degradation operated by the Securitate and its “pressure” mechanisms is recognized 
as identity degradation to a lower condition, the “undignified condition of a snitch”.
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What is interesting here is how the writer constructs his self‑identity as the (inevitable) 
outcome of past and present subject positions and social practices (Wetherell, 2007). A 
variety of social practices (including especially those of the Securitate) have the power to 
demote the person to a transgressive, “undignified” category – the informer, the snitch. He 
describes and enacts a “deference stance” to the Securitate’s power of degradation. It is 
this deference stance which mortifies the self and forces it into an undignified posture. The 
indignity that the Securitate has placed upon himself is complemented by the indignity that 
he must suffer now, opening the self to the public, facing friends and acquaintances, and 
the wider public.
The account ends with an implicit appeal to impartiality and thoroughness; to a type 
of judgment that includes the whole scope of biographical details (“all my life”). The 
emphasis is on “all”, as an indication of a total commitment to fair judgment. It is implied 
that only a comprehensive judgment can counter or oppose the identity degradation by 
status – or institu tional “contamination”. Considering biography as a whole, and taking into 
account the formal degradation process of the Securitate is seen as the basis of a fair and 
moral judgment.
The writer can flexibly bring into play the “objective” and “subjective” features that 
are relevant to the trajectory of his account as showing genuine atonement. Public apologia 
involves a ratio of degradation as well as reintegrative meanings/orientations. Among the 
“subjective” features (see extract 4) are direct expressions of remorse (“I always felt 
culpable”, “I feel guilty today”) and recognition of the “sin” (“having lied to them through 
omission”). “Objective” features are linked to the loss of individual control over personal 
information, information and knowledge on (and of) the self, that is violated and relinquished 
to the formal archive (see extract 5).
[4] I always felt culpable, it was very difficult to see eye to eye with my friends. And I don’t 
know whether I would ever be able to do it. I feel guilty today, as I did then, mostly for having 
lied to them through omission.
[5] Only the re‑finding of my Securitate dossiers (or theirs) from that time will bring a little 
emotional balance. Until then, only penitence and persistence in a sentiment of culpability is 
left for me, one that I had always experienced towards them.
The loss of an individual’s control over personal and biographical evidence compels the 
writer into a deference stance to the “archontic” power of the Securitate. This is a context 
where self‑assessment and self‑defense is almost impossible. By virtue of being indexed in 
the Securitate’s dossiers, he is continually exposed to status‑contamination (until otherwise 
proven, he is a “snitch”, he is like the other despicable “informers”). The lack of evidence 
stemming from the Securitate archive denies the writer the right to defend himself and 
distinguish himself from others. Social actors display and put together their own “truth‑finding 
engine” (Lynch & Bogen, 1996). The writer’s method goes through the Securitate archive. 
Self‑degradation is placed in the context of the “success” of the institutional degradation 
ceremony (that of the Securitate) and the perverse effect of the Securitate’s transformation 
of identity.
Displaying atonement does not absolve him, but rather places him in a paradoxical 
situation. He can affirm his side of the story, but he cannot fully defend it. Apologia is 
usually accompanied by a “plea for closure”, yet the writer is unable to close the hermeneutic 
circle opened by the “archive”. Knowledge (as yet undisclosed) of a person’s deeds has the 
power to demote the person to a lower moral type (Garfinkel, 1956) and “keep” it there. 
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Concluding comments
In all the examples presented here, one can see the writer engaged in a struggle against an 
imputation of a deviant moral essence. Reflexively, accounts are framed as a self‑dialogue 
or self‑interrogation. The writer is the “interrogator” who is trying to get himself to make 
admissions about his own past and biography. The writer dramatizes, he “stages” the story 
of his own self‑degradation. The moral of the story is that passage through institutions (like 
the Securitate) can have both dramatic and subtle effects. These effects continue, perniciously, 
even long after the institutions lost their active force as manipulators of subjectivities. As 
professional degrader, the Securitate can extend its reach even after it ceased to fulfill its 
function as a control and disciplinary mechanism of an authoritarian state.
As a consequence, the writer’s moral self‑portrait (and associated moral implications) 
is unfinished. Deviance, transgression, guilt, though expressed and justified, are paradoxically 
undecidable. Individual memory needs to be complemented by organizational memory; 
individual subjectivity, experiential biography needs to be complemented by “subjectivity” 
as a product of organizational processing. Organizational memory is potentially available 
there to confirm, use, erase, or deny the identity degradation “record”, to promote a different 
version of identity, one that may bring absolution. The personal (personal biography, personal 
identity) and the institutional web of the Securitate are not separate dimensions of social 
life but rather stand in a complex relationship. The perverse effect of the Securitate’s 
degradation of identity is complemented by a move of self‑degradation and attempt at 
reintegration (when the confessor/apologist faces the public). What I referred to as a process 
of (re)writing biography (see Tileagă, 2011) is not simply a process of re‑claiming identity 
from under the control of the Securitate archive. (Re)writing biography is mediated by a 
double dynamic of degradation. Any public moral judgment or social scientific analysis has 
to be sensitive to this double dynamic of degradation.
This has implications for how we study identity, especially when focusing on social 
practices of reconciliation with the recent communist past. Public apologia is a social 
practice whose effect is to constitute a “psychology, formulate a mental life” (Wetherell, 
2007, p. 668) and a distinctive identity for the apologist. It is sometimes too easily forgotten 
that public apologia is a performance, ritual, ceremony, which opens a space for “dignified 
restoration of the harm resulting from wrongdoing” (Braithwaite, 2000, p. 129). The 
repentance rituals of politicians and public figures create a very specific form of restorative 
justice (Braithwaite, 1999) where the apology is the necessary (and sometimes, sufficient) 
condition for successful degradation and successful reintegration. Analyses of public 
apologies tend to focus less on their restorative properties and ways of discursively managing 
moral identity and moral accountability (Tileagă, 2009b; 2011).
Analyzing apologia as a social product and discursive accomplishment, researchers can 
also draw attention to the various sources of subjectivity and identity. Identity can be sourced 
from the inside, the outcome of a self‑reflexive exercise (the narratives people tell about 
themselves reflect on their own selves), as well as from the outside (the way individuals or 
groups are situated by other people’s stories or institutions of social regulation and control). 
Individuals are involved in the construction of “usable” pasts (Wertsch, 2007) which rely 
on constructing some version of “usable” identities – acceptable to self and others. The 
interplay between inside and outside sources or constraints on identity construction can 
help us understand the vagaries, ambivalences of personal and social positioning, the 
difficulties and ambiguities of personal and social memory in Eastern Europe.
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The process of degradation (personal and institutional) discussed in this paper can be 
seen as encompassing both inside and outside sources of identity construction. Social actors 
can use degradation, in its various forms, as a moral resource for re‑thinking personal and 
social identities. In order to do so, social actors need to engage with a textually mediated reality 
(Lynch, 1999; Tileagă, 2011). In the context of public apologia for wrongdoing, individual 
self‑degradation is the creative practice that provides the possibility of resisting the “archontic 
power” (Derrida, 1997) and the institutional degradation operated by the communist state and 
its secret police. Social actors’ own identity demotion, their thoughts, personal recollections 
or material archives act as “memory devices” (Featherstone, 2006) and identity sources, 
means of resisting or opposing the “success” of past institutional degradation.
Apologia publică, transgresiunea  
şi ceremoniile de degradare
Rezumat: Acest articol se opreşte asupra câtorva aspecte psihosociale ale reconcilierii cu trecutul 
recent în Europa de Est aplecându‑se asupra unei apologii publice a unui intelectual public român 
pe tema colaborării sale prezumtive cu Securitatea, fosta poliţie secretă comunistă. Articolul 
sugerează că apologia publică pentru greşelile făcute în trecut ia forma unei dinamici duble de 
degradare: personală şi instituţională. Apologia publică indeplineşte două funcţii: pe de o parte, e o 
încercare de a „negocia” o identitate personală „pătată”. Astfel, oferă justificarea necesară răscumpărării 
păcatului. Pe de altă parte, e o încercare de (re)scriere a biografiei prin elucidarea influenţei şi 
rolului contextului social mai larg relevant al transformării identitare. Folosindu‑se de rezultate ale 
cercetărilor sociologice asupra ceremoniilor de degradare şi analiza discursului în psihologia socială, 
articolul arată cum apologia publică poate fi înţeleasă ca produs social şi realizare discursivă.
Cuvinte‑cheie: biografie, ceremonii de degradare, psihologie discursivă, trecut comunist, apologie 
publică, reconcliere, transgresiune morală
 
Excuses publiques, trangression morale 
et cérémonies de dégradation
Résumé: Cet article présente certains aspects psychosociaux de la réconciliation avec le passé 
récent dans l’Europe de l’Est en s’appuyant sur une apologie publique d’un intellectuel publique 
roumain sur le thème de sa collaboration présomptive avec la Securitate, l’ancienne police secrète 
communiste. L’article suggère que l’apologie publique pour fautes commises dans le passé prend 
la forme d’une double dynamique de degradation: personnelle et institutionelle. L’apologie publique 
a deux fonctions: d’une part, est une tentative de «négocier» une identité personnelle «tachée». 
Ainsi, elle offre la justification nécessaire pour la réparation du péché. D’autre part, est une tentative 
de réécrire la biographie en élucidant l’influence et le rôle du contexte social plus large lié à la 
transformation identitaire. L’article souligne l’apport des recherches sociologiques sur les cérémonies 
de dégradation et l’analyse du discours en psychologie sociale comme moyens de comprendre 
l’apologie publique comme produit social et accomplissement discursif.
Mots‑clés: biographie, cérémonies de dégradation, psychologie discursive, passé communiste, 
apologie publique, reconciliation, transgression morale
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